China’s growing presence in Laos pressures Vietnam
China is expanding its military footprint in Southeast Asia through a new aviation academy in Laos, a move that Hanoi views as a tightening of the strategic circle around Vietnam. The Ban Keun facility, announced jointly by China and Laos on 29 September, has prompted Vietnam to aggressively deepen defense and political ties with both Laos and Cambodia to secure its western border.
According to reporting from fulcrum.sg, the Ban Keun joint training centre and aviation academy has become a focal point for regional security analysts. While the project is ostensibly designed to train Lao pilots, its lack of transparency regarding cost, duration, and personnel has fueled speculation that the site could serve as China’s first permanent air base in Southeast Asia.
Current satellite imagery provides a limited view of the facility’s capabilities. The site currently features a roughly 2,000m runway, a modest apron, and eight K-8 jet trainers. Security expert Olli Pekka Suorsa noted that this infrastructure is currently better suited for training than for large-scale power projection.
The potential for expanded capability
The current configuration of Ban Keun may only be a temporary stage in its development. Construction is ongoing, and the runway has the physical capacity to be extended by up to 1,000m. Such an expansion would allow the facility to accommodate much larger aircraft, including strategic bombers.
The risk to Vietnam is categorized by analysts as a peacetime strategic concern rather than an immediate threat of war. While Chinese combat aircraft can already strike any part of Vietnam from mainland Chinese bases, a permanent facility in Laos changes how operations are conducted. With the consent of Vientiane, Ban Keun could eventually host radar systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, or intelligence-gathering aircraft.
These capabilities would provide Beijing with enhanced situational awareness over mainland Southeast Asia, specifically targeting Vietnam’s western fringes and parts of Thailand. This follows a pattern seen at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base. After a China-funded upgrade, Chinese corvettes were observed berthing there for several months starting in December 2023, despite claims from Phnom Penh that any such deployment was not permanent.
Hanoi’s defensive encirclement
Vietnam now faces a multi-directional security challenge. Beijing maintains a presence to the north, contests the Paracel Islands to the east, and maintains significant maritime activity in the Spratly Islands to the southeast. The development of Ban Keun and the existing presence at Ream move the pressure closer to Vietnam’s western and southwestern flanks.
Through a Vietnamese lens, China’s strategy resembles weiqi, or the game of Go, where a player gradually surrounds an opponent’s territory to eliminate their room to maneuver. Unlike the overt pressure Beijing applies to the Philippines, China appears to be using a combination of long-term encirclement and economic dominance to constrain Vietnam.
A Vietnamese official told AP that a Chinese deployment in Laos would “naturally place a certain degree of additional military pressure on Vietnam.”

Hanoi has responded to these shifts not with public confrontation, but with a rapid increase in high-level diplomatic and military engagement. This follows the Vietnamese doctrine of protecting the country “early and from afar,” which seeks to address security threats at their inception and beyond national borders.
Diplomatic surges in 2026
Following the 14th Party Congress, General Secretary To Lam prioritized Laos and Cambodia, making them his first foreign destinations of his new term in February. Trilateral cooperation and high-level visits have increased during this period to prevent strategic isolation.
Recent diplomatic milestones include:
- February 2026: General Secretary To Lam conducts high-level visits to Laos and Cambodia.
- October 2026: Prime Minister Le Minh Hung conducts his first official visits to both neighbors since taking office.
- 14 October 2026: Defence Minister General Phan Van Giang hosts the 10th trilateral defence ministers’ meeting and a joint civil defence exercise.
Vietnam has historically maintained a gentle and conciliatory approach toward its neighbors on sensitive issues, such as Mekong hydropower dams and Cambodia’s 2024 withdrawal from the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area. This strategy aims to give Vientiane and Phnom Penh the political space to manage their own domestic pressures and their relationships with China.
As the Ban Keun project continues to evolve, Vietnam’s strategy rests on maintaining these vital political and security links. By securing its western flank through these “special relations,” Hanoi seeks to preserve its freedom of movement and prevent China’s long-term encirclement from becoming an inescapable reality.
General Khamlieng, the Lao Defence Minister, traveled to Hanoi barely two weeks after the Ban Keun ceremony, showing that these regional negotiations are moving quickly.