A Delaware Bar section proposed a state-law framework for precatory shareholder proposals contingent on the SEC rescinding Rule 14a-8.
Delaware is drafting the rules that could replace the federal shareholder proposal machine, and the first draft keeps the door shut for all but the biggest public companies.
The Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association released a white paper and discussion draft on November 9 proposing a new Section 214 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
It would create a state-law framework for precatory, non-binding shareholder proposals — but only if the Securities and Exchange Commission follows through on its September proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8, the federal rule that has governed the process for roughly 80 years.
“The DGCL does not directly address whether stockholders have a state-law right to present precatory proposals or the extent to which a charter or bylaws may regulate them, nor does it provide any default right to require a corporation to include a stockholder proposal in its proxy materials,” the Council wrote in its white paper.
If the SEC finalizes its rescission, the Delaware statute would become the exclusive vehicle for stockholders of Delaware corporations to put advisory measures before their peers. The draft draws a hard line at $30 billion in market capitalization. Companies below that threshold would face no statutory obligation to include stockholder proposals in their proxy materials at all.
The tiered basket: three, two, one, none
The proposal sorts covered companies into three tiers based on market capitalization measured ten days before the record date for the prior year’s annual meeting. Each tier caps the number of precatory proposals that can appear on the proxy card.
| Tier | Market Capitalization | Maximum Proposals Per Annual Meeting |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 | $100 billion or more | Three |
| Tier 2 | $50 billion to $100 billion | Two |
| Tier 3 | $30 billion to $50 billion | One |
| Below Tier 3 | Less than $30 billion | None |
When more qualifying proposals are submitted than the cap allows, the “basket” fills with the proposals backed by the largest aggregate share ownership among proponents and their co-filers. Later withdrawal of a selected proposal does not open a slot for the next in line.
Ownership thresholds jump from thousands to millions
The financial barrier to entry would rise dramatically. A proponent must beneficially own at least $250,000 in market value of voting stock individually, or $1 million together with up to nine co-filers. Shares must be held continuously for at least 365 days ending on the 30th day before the submission deadline. Under the current Rule 14a-8, the ownership requirement ranges from $2,000 to $25,000 depending on holding period.
Newly public companies would receive a five-year grace period from their initial listing date before the regime applies, unless their certificate of incorporation sets an earlier start. After that window closes, a corporation could opt out entirely through a charter or bylaw amendment approved at a stockholder meeting — not by written consent — with each class and series of voting stock voting separately. That opt-out would eliminate all stockholder-submitted precatory proposals.
Objective exclusions replace the “ordinary business” test
The draft lists twelve specific bases for exclusion. They are largely procedural or bright-line: failure to deliver required information, exceeding the 500-word limit for proposal and supporting statement combined, missing the 180-day deadline, failing the ownership test, questioning a director nominee’s character, a proponent’s prior proposal receiving less than 15% support at either of the two preceding annual meetings, seeking to redress a personal grievance, attempting to circumvent the statute’s framework, acting on behalf of the corporation or its officers and directors, or submitting a proposal no rational person would deem relevant to the company’s business.
Notably absent is Rule 14a-8’s subjective “ordinary business” exclusion, which has generated decades of no-action letter requests and litigation. The Council said a primary goal was to develop a framework that is “largely objective in order to minimize the risk of litigation between companies and stockholder proponents,” according to the white paper.
Disputes go straight to the Court of Chancery
If a company excludes a proposal, the proponent may challenge the decision by filing suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery within 30 days of the determination notice. The corporation bears the burden of proving the exclusion was proper. The company must notify all proponents of its final decisions within 60 days after the submission deadline.
Qualifying proposals that are not withdrawn must be included in the proxy statement, on the proxy card, and with the supporting statement. The company may include its own statement in opposition. As under current practice, no vote occurs unless the proponent or a proxy holder attends the meeting and requests a vote, or the chair submits the proposal for a vote.
Private ordering is nearly eliminated
Section 214 would be the exclusive mechanism. Charters and bylaws could neither add to nor reduce the statutory requirements; the only private ordering choice is the binary opt-out available after five years.
The board retains discretion to voluntarily submit any precatory proposal to a vote, including one suggested by a stockholder. The draft would not alter Delaware law governing binding stockholder actions, such as proposals related to director elections, removals, or bylaw amendments.
The calendar: 2027 stays federal, 2028 is the target
For the 2027 proxy season, Rule 14a-8 would likely remain in effect, although companies would need to handle exclusion determinations without the SEC staff's no-action letter review process. The Council opened a 60-day comment period ending January 8, 2027.
Following that, a revised draft would go to a vote of the Corporation Law Section, then the DSBA Executive Committee, before submission to the Delaware General Assembly, which sits during the first half of 2027. The Council has emphasized timing: preparation for the 2028 proxy season would begin shortly after the legislative session concludes in June 2027.
The Delaware State Bar Association, founded in 1923 as a voluntary bar, counts roughly 90 percent of the state’s private-practice attorneys among its members. Its Corporation Law Section, with more than 500 attorneys, judges and academics, formulates and recommends amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law and related statutes for approval by the DSBA Executive Committee before submission to the General Assembly.
The white paper is ambiguous about what happens if Rule 14a-8 rescission becomes effective but is then stayed or vacated. Until the SEC acts and Delaware enacts the statute, the current federal framework remains the law of the land.