The Supreme Court’s decision in Groff v. DeJoy rewrote the standard for religious accommodations in the workplace, but lower courts are applying only half the ruling, creating a bind for employers trying to predict the cost of accommodations that haven’t happened yet.
In a new note published in the Virginia Law Review, Theodore Leeds Armstrong argues that post- Groff decisions have latched onto the heightened “substantial increased costs” standard while ignoring the Court’s instruction to conduct a flexible, commonsense inquiry.
That gap leaves employers facing a dilemma: deny an accommodation based on predicted costs and risk liability for religious discrimination, or grant it and absorb costs that may be substantial but impossible to prove in advance.
The problem is most acute for costs that are not strictly financial. Armstrong identifies reputational damage, mission derailment, and dignitary harm as categories that may be substantial if realized yet difficult to quantify without running the experiment the employer wants to avoid. Vaccination mandates and name-and-pronoun policies have become the primary flashpoints for these disputes.
“When courts treat hypothetical costs as categorically suspect, employers face a dilemma,” Armstrong writes. “Deny the accommodation based on a prediction that the costs would be too great to bear, risking liability for failure to accommodate religion; or grant the accommodation, eliminating the risk of liability for failure to accommodate religion but taking on risk in the form of the predicted costs.”
The Groff decision rejected the “more than a de minimis cost” test from Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, holding instead that undue hardship means “substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of [the employer’s] particular business.” The Court also instructed courts to consider “all relevant factors” in a commonsense manner. Armstrong contends that lower courts have embraced the heightened standard but discarded the flexibility.
Armstrong proposes a three-part framework for evaluating an employer’s ex ante cost predictions. First, courts should examine the employer’s own conduct: a policy that is selectively enforced or casually suspended deserves little deference. Second, they should ask whether the employer’s decision-making process was reasonable. Third, where uncertainty remains, courts should acknowledge that the prospect of harm borne disproportionately by vulnerable third parties justifies more deference to the employer’s prediction.
The analysis appears in Volume 112, Issue 7 of the Virginia Law Review, alongside articles on emergency powers in environmental law and employer-drafted disclaimers in human resources documents.