Cambodia initiated compulsory conciliation with Thailand under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) over a 26,000-square-kilometer patch of the Gulf of Thailand on June 2, ending a quarter-century of stalled bilateral talks and testing whether international law can succeed where diplomacy has failed.
The move came three weeks after Thailand’s cabinet voted to terminate the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding that had governed the overlapping claims area (OCA), a framework that yielded only two formal negotiating rounds in 25 years. Prime Minister Hun Manet framed the unilateral filing as “not escalation” but “a facilitated negotiation between two nations overseen by international expert conciliators.”
Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow countered that it was a “rushed decision” that risked stalling efforts to rebuild trust. Thailand nevertheless appointed its conciliators, and a five-member commission of renowned international lawyers was constituted on September 14.
The first session convened in Singapore from September 14–16, followed by a second in The Hague from October 14–18. The commission must issue its report within 12 months of its constitution — by mid-September 2027 — unless both parties agree to extend the deadline.
That precedent, the only compulsory conciliation ever completed under UNCLOS, produced a historic maritime boundary treaty after the commission’s recommendations broke a decades-long deadlock over the Timor Sea.
The legal trap Thailand set for itself
When UNCLOS was negotiated, states unwilling to accept compulsory court or arbitral jurisdiction over maritime delimitation were allowed to opt out — but only if they accepted compulsory conciliation instead. Thailand lodged exactly such a declaration under Article 298(1)(a)(i). By rejecting the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals, Bangkok contractually obligated itself to “accept submission of the matter to conciliation” when Phnom Penh invoked the mechanism.

Article 12 of Annex V makes clear that a party’s refusal to participate does not bar the proceedings. Cambodia ratified UNCLOS on February 6, 2026, after its Senate approved the law in January 2026. Thai parliamentary experts had warned in September 2025 that terminating the 2001 MOU might prompt exactly this response, reducing Thailand’s control over the process.
What each side wants
In opening statements in Singapore, Cambodia laid out a three-part agenda: a treaty establishing a single all-purpose maritime boundary; an interim joint development and resource-sharing agreement pending final delimitation; and, failing those, the commission’s formal recommendations on questions of fact and law. Thailand insisted the proceedings concern “only maritime boundary delimitation,” explicitly excluding joint development from the scope.
The gap is large. The 2001 MOU split the OCA along the 11th parallel north, designating one bloc for joint hydrocarbon development and the other for delimitation of the territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone. Neither objective was achieved. Cambodia now seeks to recombine them; Thailand wants to keep them separate.
Why the commission matters more than the law
Conciliation under Annex V is a hybrid of inquiry and mediation. The commission can hear the parties, examine claims, propose solutions, and issue non-binding recommendations that carry diplomatic and political weight. It cannot impose a settlement. Procedural rules are flexible — the parties and commission adopt them jointly, and hearings can be kept confidential.
Phattharaphong Saengkrai, a lecturer at Thammasat University’s Faculty of Law and author of the ISEAS Perspective, argues that two conditions for a productive outcome are already present: both governments have publicly committed to good-faith engagement, and the legal teams on all sides are deeply versed in the law, diplomacy, and political sensitivities of compulsory conciliation.
The nationalist undertow
Public sentiment in both countries remains volatile. The ISEAS analysis warns of a “palpable nationalist mood on both sides and public scepticism about the conciliation’s outcome.” Cambodia’s ratification of UNCLOS and Thailand’s termination of the MOU were both framed domestically as assertions of sovereignty. Any compromise on the boundary line or resource sharing will be attacked by hardliners as a sellout.
Yet both governments share a structural incentive: they need a replacement framework for the defunct 2001 MOU. At minimum, the ISEAS report concludes, the conciliation should produce an agreed mechanism for future negotiation. Whether it yields a boundary treaty, a joint development deal, or merely the commission’s recommendations depends on political will that has been absent for 25 years.
Hun Manet, a 1999 West Point graduate and former four-star general, played a direct role in the 2008 Cambodian–Thai stand-off negotiations before entering politics. As prime minister, Manet now oversees the compulsory conciliation his government initiated, a process that will test whether his military and diplomatic experience can resolve the maritime dispute that eluded his predecessor.
The commission’s report is due by September 2027.